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Abstract. The fact that modern Networked Industrial Control Systems
(NICS) depend on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
is well known. Although many studies have focused on the security of
NICS, today we still lack a proper understanding of the impact that
network design choices have on the resilience of NICS, e.g., a network
architecture using VLAN segmentation. In this paper we investigate the
impact of process control network segmentation on the resilience of phys-
ical processes. We consider an adversary capable of reprogramming the
logic of control hardware in order to disrupt the normal operation of the
physical process. Our analysis that is based on the Tennessee-Eastman
chemical process proves that network design decisions significantly in-
crease the resilience of the process using as resilience metric the time
that the process is able to run after the attack is started, before shut-
ting down. Therefore a resilience-aware network design can provide a
tolerance period of several hours that would give operators more time to
intervene, e.g., switch OFF devices or disconnect equipment in order to
reduce damages.
Keywords: network segmentation, cyber-physical, resilience, security.
1 Introduction
Modern Critical Infrastructures (CI), e.g., power plants, water plants and smart
grids, rely on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for their op-
eration since ICT can lead to cost optimization as well as greater efficiency,
flexibility and interoperability between components. In the past CIs were iso-
lated environments and used proprietary hardware and protocols, limiting thus
the threats that could affect them. Nowadays CIs, or more specifically Networked
Industrial Control Systems (NICS), are exposed to significant cyber-threats; a
fact that has been highlighted by many studies on the security of Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [7,11]. The recently reported
Stuxnet worm [8] is the first malware specifically designed to attack NICS. Its
ability to reprogram the logic of control hardware in order to alter physical pro-
cesses demonstrated how powerful such threats can be. Stuxnet was a concrete
R. Bestak et al. (Eds.): NETWORKING 2012, Part I, LNCS 7289, pp. 121–134, 2012.
c© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2012
122 B. Genge and C. Siaterlis
proof of a successful cyber-physical attack but by no means a trivial attack. It
required a thorough knowledge of the physical system, software and OS vulner-
abilities.
The size of physical processes led plant designers to structure SCADA sys-
tem components into multiple network segments, i.e., Virtual Lans (VLANs),
[2] interconnected with wireless devices. One of the main advantages of this
approach is that malware infections do not propagate to other VLANs unless
the attacker is capable to compromise the protection mechanism, e.g., firewalls,
of other VLANs as well. Nevertheless, the compromise of one network segment
could cause the physical process to shut down, e.g., physical damage, unless de-
signers take appropriate measures to limit the effects of a single compromised
control network segment.
Based on these facts, in this paper we investigate the relationship between
control network segmentation and the resilience of physical processes. We con-
sider an adversary with a level of sophistication similar to the case of Stuxnet
[8] that is able to take over an entire control network segment, i.e., VLAN. The
goal of the attacker is to disrupt the normal operation of the physical process by
reprogramming the logic of control hardware, as in the case of Stuxnet. The at-
tack scenario was implemented with our previously developed framework [9] that
uses real-time simulation for the physical components and an emulation testbed
based on Emulab [17] to recreate the cyber part of NICS, e.g., SCADA servers,
corporate network. In the implemented scenario we used the Tennessee-Eastman
chemical process [5].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After an overview of related
work in Section 2, we provide a discussion on the segmentation problem and
implemented attack scenarios in Section 3. We continue with the presentation
of experimental results in Section 4 and we conclude in Section 5.
2 Related Work
According to Wei and Ji [16], a resilient control system is one that is able to:
(i) minimize the incidence of undesirable incidents; (ii) mitigate the undesirable
incidents; and (iii) recover to normal operation in a short time. In this context our
analysis points out an important factor to increase the resilience of industrial
systems: the segmentation of process control networks into VLANs. However,
this is only one factor that could be considered. Several others were identified
with solutions proposed by other authors as well. This section provides a brief
presentation of those approaches that mostly relate to ours.
The work of Ca´rdenas, et al. [3] clearly pointed out that intrusion detection
systems combined with a reaction mechanism that closes the system monitoring
loop are able to effectively increase the resilience of the system. Their work
showed that control loops implemented in control hardware, i.e., Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs), can be adjusted in order to counteract the effects of
Denial of Service attacks. In the field of Smart Grids, the work of Zhu, et al. [18]
showed that routing is a major concern and proposed a secure routing protocol to
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increase the resilience of Smart Grids. The work of Chen, et al. [4] addressed the
importance of hierarchical control solutions for increasing the resilience of Power
Grids. The proposed solution uses well-established control theory to guarantee
accuracy and system stability. Finally, we mention the recent work of Ji and
Wei [10] that proposed a method to quantify the resilience of NICS in terms of
quality of control. The authors also proposed a control algorithm for wireless
NICS that is able to keep the process in a normal operating state while it is
confronted with attacks such as Radio Frequency jamming and signal blocking.
Compared to the previously mentioned techniques, the proposed segmentation-
based approach addresses more sophisticated attacks, similar to Stuxnet, that
might involve the reprogramming of PLCs. Such attacks are not addressed by
existing approaches. Moreover, even in the case of techniques that add counter-
measures to the process control network, such as the work of Ca´rdenas, et al.
[3], more sophisticated attacks are not targeted. Such approaches rely on PLCs
running legitimate control code with incorporated countermeasures, that could
be rewritten by malware. The proposed segmentation methodology could also be
combined with techniques that ensure the security of industrial systems [1,12],
leading to a system that is both secure and resilient against cyber threats.
3 Problem Statement and Attack Scenario
The Stuxnet malware was a concrete proof that nowadays attackers are capable
not only to infiltrate into the process and control networks, but are also capable
to reprogram PLCs. Such attack scenarios have an important impact on the
physical process as the code that keeps the process in its operating limits is
replaced by malicious code. Therefore, new techniques that also address more
sophisticated attacks, i.e., similar to Stuxnet, must be developed. In this section
we discuss the applicability of network segmentations to counteract such powerful
attacks. We begin with an overview of typical process control architectures and
we continue with a discussion on the proposed control network segmentation.
Finally, we provide a brief presentation on the implemented adversary model
and attack scenario.
3.1 Process Control Architecture Overview
Modern SCADA architectures have two different control layers: (i) the physical
layer, which comprises actuators, sensors and hardware devices that physically
perform the actions on the system, e.g., open a valve, measure the voltage; and
(ii) the cyber layer, which comprises all the information and communications
devices and software that acquire data, elaborate low-level process strategies
and deliver the commands to the physical layer. The cyber layer typically uses
SCADA protocols to control and manage an industrial installation. The entire
architecture can be viewed as a “distributed control system” spread among two
networks: the control network and the process network. The process network usu-
ally hosts the SCADA servers (also known as SCADA masters), human-machine
124 B. Genge and C. Siaterlis
Control network
PLC PLC
PLC
Control network
PLC PLC
PLC
Industrial
process
Physical LayerCyber Layer
SCADA server
SCADA server
Domain
controller
HMI
Engineering
station
Maintenance
server
P
rocess
netw
ork
802.11
WLAN
802.11
WLAN
Fig. 1. Process control architecture
interfaces (HMIs), domain controllers and other installation-specific nodes, e.g.,
engineering stations, maintenance servers. The control network hosts all the de-
vices that on one side control the actuators and sensors of the physical layer
and on the other side provide the control interface to the process network. A
typical control network is composed of a mesh of PLCs (Programmable Logic
Controllers), as shown in Fig. 1.
From an operational point of view, PLCs receive data from the physical layer,
elaborate a local actuation strategy, and send commands to the actuators. When
requested, PLCs also provide the data received from the physical layer to the
SCADA servers (masters) in the process network and eventually execute the
commands that they receive. In modern SCADA architectures, communications
between a master and PLCs is usually implemented in two ways: (i) through
an OPC (Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) for Process Control) layer that
helps map the PLC devices; and/or (ii) through a direct memory mapping no-
tation making use of SCADA communication protocols such as Modbus, DNP3
and Profibus.
3.2 Control Network Segmentation
The main goal of the segmentation procedure is to increase the resilience of physi-
cal processes. In practice engineers might use network segmentation for a number
of reasons such as physical constraints, e.g., location of devices, or protection of
mission-critical services. In typical implementations the segmentation is most
of the time forced by physical constraints [14] where each individual segment
is isolated from the rest and includes network security protection mechanisms,
e.g., firewalls. These segments are interconnected by VPNs and are remotely
accessible by engineers.
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Instead of applying typical segmentation rules such as the ones mentioned
previously, in this paper we propose a segmentation that focuses on the physical
process. The goal of the procedure is to maximize the resilience of the phys-
ical process in case of the full compromise of one or more network segments.
The procedure relies on the ability of regular control code to counterbalance
the disturbance generated by malicious code running in compromised segments.
More specifically, in the proposed approach we separate PLCs controlling input
valves (FeedPLCs) from PLCs controlling output valves (FreePLCs), associated
to the same unit. This way, the effect of compromised FeedPLCs is balanced by
legitimate FreePLCs and vice-versa.
For a better understanding of the impact of the proposed approach, let us
assume a simple scenario involving a pipe and 3 valves controlled by 3 PLCs.
In this scenario one of the control valves is feeding products into the pipe while
the other two are freeing products from the pipe. If designers would place all 3
PLCs on the same network segment (see Fig 2 (a)), in case of an attack that
compromises the entire segment the adversary would be able to OPEN the input
valve and CLOSE the output valves. This would lead to a sudden increase of
the pressure that could cause severe damages to the physical process. On the
other hand, by placing FeedPLCs and FreePLCs on separate network segments
(see Fig 2 (b)), in case one of the segments is compromised, regular PLCs could
balance the generated disturbance and avoid catastrophic consequences.
In the present study we compared the full network compromise setting to
the segmentation with the proximity and product flow criteria. Although the
analysis is limited to these settings, our main goal was not to be exhaustive,
but to show that control network segmentation plays an important role in the
resilience of physical processes.
3.3 Adversary Model and Attack Scenario
The employed adversary model reprograms PLCs with malicious code in order
to shut down the physical process. Identifying the attack vector that could com-
promise the system to enable such a scenario is not the main focus of this study.
However, the Stuxnet worm together with other studies such as the one per-
formed by Nai Fovino, et al. [11] showed that such scenarios are possible in real
settings. For instance, corporate firewalls could be compromised by infected user
stations within the corporate network. A similar scenario was recently reported
by Google [6], the official report stating that errors in Web browser implemen-
tations enabled the installation of a malware on a user’s machine within the
corporate network. From there the malware spread and infected other stations
as well. Another example is the Stuxnet worm that included several attack vec-
tors such as USB drives and vulnerabilities in the Operating System, but also
vulnerabilities in the Siemens WinCC/Step 7 software. WinCC/Step 7 is the
software used to communicate with a variety of PLCs produced by Siemens. By
exploiting vulnerabilities in this software, the designers of Stuxnet were able not
only to reprogram PLCs but to also hide the changes from human operators.
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Fig. 2. Effect of compromised PLCs on the physical process: (a) proximity-based
segmentation, and (b) product flow-based segmentation
As pointed out by Ca´rdenas, et al. [3] attacks that target the minimum/ max-
imum value of parameters/control variables are the ones that can damage the
process in relatively short time periods. Such attacks cause the accumulation
of products, e.g., steam or water, by completely opening valves that feed prod-
ucts into units and completely closing valves that free products from units. The
attack model employed in this study follows the same procedure to force the
physical process to shut down. More specifically, based on the documentation
of the physical process, the malicious code completely opens input valves and
completely closes output valves.
4 Experimental Setting and Results
The results presented in this section prove that network segmentation can be an
effective approach to increase the resilience of physical processes confronted with
sophisticated attacks. For this purpose we use as a resilience metric the time that
the process is able to run after the attack is started, before shutting down, i.e.,
shut down time (SDT). First, the SDT is measured for each compromised VLAN,
as generated by the segmentation procedure mentioned in the previous sections.
Then, the SDT is compared to the SDT of the full network compromise setting
to show the benefits of product flow-based segmentation over proximity/ad-hoc
segmentation.
We start the presentation with an overview of the experimentation framework
and of the Tennessee-Eastman chemical plant used as the physical process model.
We continue with an overview of the experimental setup and finally we present
the experimental results.
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4.1 Overview of the Experimentation Framework
In the context of the experimental scenario described in the previous sections
we simulated the physical process and we emulated the cyber layer using the
experimentation framework developed in our previous work [9]. There are several
reasons why we have chosen this approach for our study. First, by testing the
resilience of a real system there could be concerns about the potential side effects
of the experiment. Second, software based simulation has always been considered
an efficient approach to study physical systems, mainly because it can offer
low-cost, fast and accurate analysis. Nevertheless, it has limited applicability in
the context of cyber security due to the diversity and complexity of computer
networks. Software simulators can effectively model normal operations, but fail
to capture the way computer systems fail.
The experimentation framework developed in our previous work [9] follows
a hybrid approach, where the Emulab-based testbed recreates the control and
process network of NICS, including PLCs and SCADA servers, and a software
simulation reproduces the physical processes. The architecture, as shown in
Fig. 3, clearly distinguishes 3 layers: the cyber layer, the physical layer and
a link layer in between. The cyber layer includes regular ICT components used
in SCADA systems, while the physical layer provides the simulation of physical
devices. The link layer, i.e., cyber-physical layer, provides the “glue” between
the two layers through the use of a shared memory region.
The physical layer is recreated through a soft real-time simulator that runs
within the SC (Simulation Core) unit and executes a model of the physical
process. The cyber layer is recreated by an emulation testbed that uses the
Emulab architecture and software [17] to automatically and dynamically map
physical components, e.g., servers, switches, to a virtual topology. Besides the
process network, the cyber layer also includes the control logic code that in the
real world is run by PLCs. The control code can be run sequentially or in parallel
to the physical model. In the sequential case, a tightly coupled code (TCC) is
used, i.e., code that is running in the same memory space with the model, within
the SC unit. In the parallel case a loosely coupled code (LCC) is used, i.e.,
code that is running in another address space, possibly on another host, within
the R-PLC unit (Remote PLC). The main advantage of TCCs is that these
do not miss values generated by the model between executions. On the other
hand, LCCs allow running PLC code remotely, to inject (malicious) code without
stopping the execution of the model, and to run more complex PLC emulators.
The unit that implements global decision algorithms based on the sensor values
received from the R-PLC units is also present in the experimentation framework
as the Master unit. The cyber-physical layer incorporates the PLC memory,
seen as a set of registers typical of PLCs, and the communication interfaces
that “glue” together the other two layers. Memory registers provide the link to
the inputs, e.g., valve position, and outputs, e.g., sensor values, of the physical
model.
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Prototypes of SC, R-PLC and Master Units have been developed in C#
(Windows) and have been ported and tested on Unix-based systems (FreeBSD,
Fedora and Ubuntu) with the help of the Mono platform. Matlab Simulink was
used as the physical process simulator (physical layer). From Simulink models
the corresponding ‘C’ code is generated using Matlab Real Time Workshop.
The communication between SC and R-PLC units is handled by .NET’s binary
implementation of RPC (called remoting) over TCP. For the communication
between the R-PLC and Master units, we used the Modbus over TCP protocol.
4.2 Tennessee-Eastman Chemical Process
The TE process is a well-known problem in the automation and process control
community mainly because it represents a hypothetical chemical plant that is
very similar to an actual plant. The model has been provided by the Tennessee
Eastman company [5]. The schematic for the TE process is presented in Fig. 5
where we also show the associated PLCs.
The process is fairly complex: it produces two products from four reactants
and the plant has a total of seven operating modes that include a base operating
condition. The plant simulation provides a total of 41 measurements and 12
manipulated variables. In this use case we assume that the plant is controlled
by the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), i.e., TCCs, that implement the
base control strategy proposed by Sozio [15].
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4.3 Experiment Setup
The attack scenario described in the previous sections was implemented in the
Joint Research Centre’s (JRC) Experimental Platform for Internet Contingen-
cies (EPIC) laboratory. The Emulab testbed included nodes with the following
configuration: FreeBSD OS 8, AMD Athlon Dual Core CPU at 2.3GHz and 4GB
of RAM. In our experiments we used the TE model implementation given as a
Matlab ‘C’-based MEX S-Function, developed by Ricker [13], from which the
stand-alone ‘C’ code was generated using the Matlab Real Time Workshop. The
generated code was integrated into the experimentation framework in order to
interact with the real components of the emulation testbed. Regular and mali-
cious control code were implemented as TCCs. The experimental setup is shown
in Fig. 4.
The results of the segmentation procedure, based on the segmentation criteria
discussed in the previous sections, are given in Fig. 5. For the proximity criteria
(see Fig. 5 (a)) - setting A, we defined 3 segments based on the proximity to the
3 main units (Reactor, Separator and Stripper), each implemented as a separate
VLAN. By using the same 3 main units we also defined 3 segments based on the
product flow criteria - setting B, as shown in Fig. 5 (b). In both figures we used
a white color for PLCs on VLAN 1 and VLAN 1’, light gray for PLCs on VLAN
2 and VLAN 2’ and dark gray for PLCs on VLAN 3 and VLAN 3’.
4.4 Experimental Results
As a result of the previously described segmentation procedure, 6 independent
VLANs were identified for both settings, i.e., settings A and B. For each VLAN
we implemented the attack scenario described in the previous sub-sections and
we measured the shut down time (SDT).
The operation of the TE process for 40h without any disturbances is shown
in Fig. 6, where the target setpoints are illustrated with a dashed line. With
the implemented control loops the process is able to run in a steady-state, as
shown by the two sub-figures depicting the behavior of two parameters that
could trigger a shut down of the process. Without these control loops, process
parameters would reach their shut down limits after approximately 3.6h [15].
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Fig. 5. Tennessee-Eastman process and associated PLCs: (a) control network
segmentation in setting A, and (b) control network segmentation in setting B
2696
2700
2704
2708
2712
0 10 20 30 40R
ea
ct
or
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
(k
Pa
 g
au
ge
) 
Time (h) 
(a)
46
48
50
52
54
0 10 20 30 40
St
rip
pe
r l
ev
el
 (%
) 
Time (h) 
(b)
Fig. 6. Normal operation of the Tennessee-Eastman process for 40h without any
disturbances: (a) Reactor pressure, and (b) Stripper level
After running the TE process for 10h, in the next step we launched the at-
tack scenario described in the previous sections. First, the attack was launched
against the full control network and then against each VLAN identified in the
segmentation procedure. Because of space considerations we only illustrate the
behavior of the process for the maximum SDT for settings A and B. A summary
of the results is given in Fig. 7.
In the full network compromise setting, all PLCs were running malicious code.
This lead to the shut down of the TE process in 0.05h (3min), caused by an
increase in the Reactor pressure above the 3000kPa shut down limit. The Reactor
pressure for this setting was illustrated in Fig. 8 (a). In the remaining of this
section we use the measured SDT from this setting to show that the SDT can
be increased with control network segmentation.
In setting A, the maximum SDT was measured in case VLAN 2 was compro-
mised, while the minimum SDT was measured in case of VLAN 3. As shown in
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Fig. 7. Shut down time: (a) setting A, (b) setting B, and (c) compared results
Table 1. Reason for shut down of the Tennessee-Eastman process
Setting Compromised VLAN Shut down reason
Full network – high reactor pressure
A
1 high reactor pressure
2 high reactor pressure
3 high stripper liquid level
B
1’ high reactor pressure
2’ high reactor pressure
3’ high stripper liquid level
Fig. 8 (b), the attack on VLAN 2 increased the Reactor pressure above the shut
down limit of 3000kPa in 3.26h. In case of the compromise of the remaining two
VLANs we measured a smaller SDT. Thus, for VLAN 1 the measured SDT was
0.15h, while for VLAN 3 it was 0.07h. For VLAN 1, the shut down of the TE
process was caused by an excessive increase of the Reactor pressure, while for
VLAn 3 it was caused by high liquid levels in the Stripper unit. We summarized
the results for setting A in Fig. 7 (a) and Table 1.
By comparing the results from setting A with the SDT from the full control
network setting, we see an increase of 0.02h for the minimum SDT and of 3.21h
for the maximal SDT. In the field of Information Security it is a well known
fact that the security strength of a system is given by its weakest component.
Therefore, in our context it is more important to increase the smallest SDT than
the largest or the average value for a specific setting. As in setting A the smallest
measured value was of 0.07h (4.2min), this corresponds to an increase of 40%
in the value of the minimal SDT. As shown by the results from setting B, the
minimal SDT can be further increased by employing process-specific information
in the segmentation procedure.
For setting B the segmentation procedure also generated 3 VLANs, but with a
different configuration, as shown in Fig. 5 (b). By applying the same experimen-
tal strategy for setting B, the maximum SDT was measured for the compromise of
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Fig. 8. Disturbed operation of the Tennessee-Eastman process: (a) full control network
compromise, (b) compromise of VLAN 2 in setting A, and (c) compromise of VLAN
1’ in setting B
VLAN 1’, with the effects shown in Fig. 8 (c). In this case the maximum SDT in-
creased to 23.22h, that is more than 7 times the value of the maximum SDT from
setting A. The monitored parameter illustrated in Fig. 8 (c) shows that initially
the attack causes large deviations on the process parameters. Nevertheless, after
5h legitimate PLCs from non-compromised VLANs bring the process back into
the steady-state. The TE process remains in this state for approximately 15h. Af-
ter this period the accumulated disturbances exceed to capabilities of legitimate
PLCs, causing the pressurewithin theReactor unit to increase until the shut down
limit. We also inspected the SDT for the remaining two VLANs. For VLAN 2’ the
shut down was caused by an excessive increase in the Reactor pressure, while for
VLAN 3’ the shut down was caused by a high liquid level in the Stripper unit. We
summarized the results for setting B in Fig. 7 (b) and Table 1.
A significant aspect that we should note for setting B is that the minimum
SDT increased to 0.15h (9min), that is more than twice the minimum SDT
recorded for setting A. This shows that a careful examination of the physical
process can lead to a segmentation that increases the resilience of the physical
process by more than 100%, compared to a segmentation based on the proximity
criteria. Furthermore, if we compare the increase in the minimum SDT to the
full network setting, the increase is above 200%. We summarized these results
in Fig. 7 (c).
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Based on the results from this section we can conclude that a resilience-aware
network design can provide a tolerance period of several additional minutes or
even hours. This would give operators more time to intervene, e.g., switch OFF
devices, and reduce the damages caused to the physical process.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that network design choices and specifically net-
work segmentation in VLANs can have an important impact to the resilience of
physical processes. Compared to existing approaches, the proposed method has
several advantages: (i) it can be applied to a wide variety of industrial systems;
(ii) it also targets more sophisticated attacks similar to Stuxnet; and (iii) it does
not require new error-prone software/hardware to be installed, for each segment
existing security techniques can be replicated. Our proposal can also be viewed
as complementary to existing approaches and can be implemented together with
other techniques that also address the resilience of industrial systems [3,4,18],
but do not target more sophisticated attacks. Finally, we also mention that the
proposed segmentation methodology can be combined with techniques that en-
sure the security of industrial systems [1,12], leading to installations that are
both secure and resilient against cyber threats. The study reported in this paper
is a first step in our work towards the development of a method that maximizes
the resilience of physical processes with network segmentation. As part of our
future work, we also intend to study the applicability of our proposal in the
context of more complex physical processes such as an entire Power Grid.
References
1. dos Anjos, I., Brito, A., Pires, P.M.: A model for security management of SCADA
systems. In: Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Emerging Technolo-
gies and Factory Automation, pp. 448–451 (2008)
2. Boyer, S.: Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition. International Society of Au-
tomation, USA (2010)
3. Ca´rdenas, A., Amin, S., Lin, Z.S., Huang, Y.L., Huang, C.-Y., Sastry, S.:
Attacks against process control systems: Risk assessment, detection, and response.
In: Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Com-
munications Security, pp. 355–366 (2011)
4. Chen, M., Nolan, C., Wang, X., Adhikari, S., Li, F., Qi, H.: Hierarchical utilization
control for real-time and resilient power grid. In: Proceedings of the 21st Euromicro
Conference on Real-Time Systems, pp. 66–75 (2009)
5. Downs, J.J., Vogel, E.F.: A plant-wide industrial process control problem. Com-
puters & Chemical Engineering 17(3), 245–255 (1993)
6. Drummond, D.: A new approach to China (2010),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html
7. East, S., Butts, J., Papa, M., Shenoi, S.: A taxonomy of attacks on the DNP3
protocol. IFIP AICT, vol. 311, pp. 67–81 (2009)
8. Falliere, N., Murchu, L.O., Chien, E.: W32.stuxnet dossier (2010), http://
www.wired.com/images blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32 stuxnet dossier.pdf
134 B. Genge and C. Siaterlis
9. Genge, B., Fovino, I.N., Siaterlis, C., Masera, M.: Analyzing cyber-physical attacks
on networked industrial control systems. In: Critical Infrastructure Protection, pp.
167–183 (2011)
10. Ji, K., Wei, D.: Resilient control for wireless networked control systems. Journal
of Control, Automation, and Systems 9(2), 285–293 (2011)
11. Fovino, I.N., Carcano, A., Masera, M., Trombetta, A.: An experimental investi-
gation of malware attacks on SCADA systems. Journal of Critical Infrastructure
Protection 2(4), 139–145 (2009)
12. Pal, O., Saiwan, S., Jain, P., Saquib, Z., Patel, D.: Cryptographic key management
for SCADA system: An architectural framework. In: Proceedings of International
Conference on Advances in Computing, Control, & Telecommunication Technolo-
gies, pp. 169–174 (2009)
13. Ricker, N.: Tennessee Eastman challenge archive (2002),
http://depts.washington.edu/control/LARRY/TE/download.html
14. Siemens: Security concept pcs 7 and wincc - basic document (2008),
http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/
llisapi.dll?func=cslib.csinfo&lang=en&objid=26462131&caller=view
15. Sozio, J.: Intelligent parameter adaptation for chemical processes. Master’s thesis,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA (1999)
16. Wei, D., Ji, K.: Resilient industrial control system (RICS): Concepts, formula-
tion, metrics, and insights. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on
Resilient Control Systems, pp. 15–22 (2010)
17. White, B., Lepreau, J., Stoller, L., Ricci, R., Guruprasad, S., Newbold, M., Hibler,
M., Barb, C., Joglekar, A.: An integrated experimental environment for distributed
systems and networks. In: Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Operating Systems
Design and Implementation, pp. 255–270 (2002)
18. Zhu, Q., Wei, D., Bas¸ar, T.: Secure routing in smart grids. In: Workshop on Foun-
dations of Dependable and Secure Cyber-Physical Systems (2011)
